ndent
of the supreme deity (as in certain half-civilized tribes) or is
tolerated by him (Angro Mainyu, Satan), or to a subordinate employed by
him (lies put into the mouths of prophets by a deity),[2117] or to a
quite separate divine Power, not necessarily malevolent (as in some
philosophical theories). Religion may adopt some philosophical
explanation--as that evil is only failure to reach the good, or only the
lower step to which we look back from a greater height, or an inevitable
accompaniment of a scheme of life characterized by struggle and intended
to recognize the freedom of the will and to develop moral autonomy--but,
from its own resources it can only say that it is a thing inexplicable
by man, belonging to a divine plan that the devout soul accepts as right
because God has ordained it.

+1172+. The theory of man's native incapacity to do right (total
depravity), held by some religious bodies, is antimoral since it denies
human freedom. The attempt to modify it by the supposition of divine
impartation of moral power is inadequate unless such power is held to be
given to every person, and this amounts to an indirect affirmation of
freedom and denial of moral impotency. The theory is, however,
practically innocuous, being rejected or ignored by the universal
consciousness of freedom.

+1173+. To the questions, raised by philosophy, whether the world is
essentially good or bad and whether life is worth living, theistic
religion gives a simple answer: a perfect God implies a perfect
universe; this answer is germinal and confused in early religion, and is
definitely stated only in the higher systems. The great theistic sacred
books, Jewish, Christian, Mazdean, and Moslem, all teach that though
there are present limitations and sufferings, there is to be a happy
issue for the faithful out of all distresses, and the Buddhistic view,
though nontheistic, is essentially the same as this; as for other
persons, they are sometimes included in a final restoration, when moral
evil is to disappear, sometimes are excluded from the happy outcome, but
in both cases the scheme of the world is regarded as good. Leaving out
of view the question as to the exact interpretation of the facts of
life, this optimism is ethically useful as giving cheerfulness and
enthusiasm to moral life, with power of enduring ills through the
conviction of the ultimate triumph of the right. It may pass into a
stolid dogmatic ignoring or denial of the