. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party
gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far
committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set
aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France
might expect if they recognized the South.

"I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation,
and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and
let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the
recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such
recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."

Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.

"...the French Government had some time back sounded that of
Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of
mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."

"It appears also that there is less public pressure here for
the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]."

Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell
had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than
formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for
Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American
policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded
conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will,
if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still
more important. It was already known through the French press that a
sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all
signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude
Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to
discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to
go--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently
in Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.

"I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough
for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which
Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the
interval between this time and the middle of next month.
These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the
first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to
recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of
separation and recognition accompanied