h, border state attitude
was the test of the feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary
emancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan.
Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the Confiscation
Bill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his
signature or veto. He signed it on July 12, _but did not notify that
fact to Congress until July 17._ On this same day of signature, July 12,
Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid in
voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the
congressional representatives of the border states seeking their
definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority were
emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not affect the
border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did not desire to
free the slaves even if compensated[868].

Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was forced
toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the Confiscation
Bill. On the day following his failure to win the border state
representatives he told Seward and Welles who were driving with him,
that he had come to the conclusion that the time was near for the issue
of a proclamation of emancipation as a military measure fully within the
competence of the President. This was on July 13[869]. Seward offered a
few objections but apparently neither Cabinet official did more than
listen to Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned
on July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of an
emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of which
referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would be
rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their
allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of a
gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the warning that
for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a general emancipation
of slaves would be proclaimed[870]. All of the Cabinet approved except
Blair who expressed fears of the effect on the approaching November
elections, and Seward who, while professing sympathy with the indicated
purpose, argued that the time was badly chosen in view of recent
military disasters and the approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The
measure, Seward said, might "be viewed as the last measure of an
exhausted government, a cry for help; the governme