t
that Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended for
communication to Russell[1014], and on the twenty-fourth when
presenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against the
privateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that the
"latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of the
_Alexandra_, had caused Seward to become very conciliatory. Lyons was
assured that the plan "was for the present at rest[1015]." Apparently
Seward now felt more security than did Lyons as to future British action
for three days later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milne
that an American issue of letters of marque would surely come if
England did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a way
as to indicate his own opinion that effective steps _must_ be taken to
prevent their escape[1016].

The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show that he
regarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern ship-building in
British yards as occurring in March-April, 1863. Seward became unusually
friendly, even embarrassingly so, for in August he virtually forced
Lyons to go on tour with him through the State of New York, thus making
public demonstration of the good relations of the two Governments. This
sweet harmony and mutual confidence is wholly contrary to the usual
historical treatment of the Laird Rams incident, which neglects the
threat of the privateering bill, regards American protests as steadily
increasing in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note by
Adams to Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September.
Previously, however, American historians have been able to use only
American sources and have been at a loss to understand the privateering
plan, since Seward never went beyond a vague generalization of its
object in official utterances. It is the British reaction to that plan
which reveals the real "threat" made and the actual crisis of
the incident.

It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires less
extended treatment than is customarily given to it. The correct
understanding of this later story is the recognition that Great Britain
had in April given, a pledge and performed an act which satisfied Seward
and Adams that the Rams would not be permitted to escape. It was their
duty nevertheless to be on guard against a British relaxation of the
promise made, and the delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing th