. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on February 15
he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the dates of various
documents that "at the last moment" Adams made a threat of war and
Russell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was brief and to the effect
that orders to stop the Rams had been given before the communications
from Adams were received. Finally, on February 23, a motion in the
Commons called for all correspondence with Adams and with Lairds, The
Government consented to the first but refused that with Lairds and was
supported by a vote of 187 to 153.[1038]

Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of Russell the
Tories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was virtually a vote
of censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud as was the Government
in praise of Adams and in approval of the seizure of the Rams. Naturally
their cause was weakened, and the Ministry, referring to expressions
made and intentions indicated as far back as March, 1863, thus hinting
without directly so stating that the real decision had then been made,
was easily the victor in the vote[1038]. Derby had committed an error as
a party leader and the fault rankled for again in April, 1864, he
attempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on dates of
documents. Russell's reply ignored that point altogether[1039]. It did
not suit his purpose to declare, flatly, the fact that in April
assurances had been given both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward,
that measures would be taken to prevent the departure of Southern
vessels from British ports. To have made this disclosure would have
required an explanation _why_ such assurance had been given and this
would have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northern
plan to create a _cruising squadron blockade by privateers_. _There_ was
the real threat. The later delays and seeming uncertainties of British
action made Adams anxious but there is no evidence that Russell ever
changed his purpose. He sought stronger evidence before acting and he
hoped for stronger support from legal advisers, but he kept an eye on
the Rams and when they had reached the stage where there was danger of
escape, he seized them even though the desired evidence was still
lacking[1040]. Seward's "privateering bill" plan possibly entered upon
in a moment of desperation and with no clear statement from him of its
exact application had, as the anxiety of British diplomat