s became
pronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, the
interpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been the
cessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America complained.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 966: In other respects, also, this question of belligerent
ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in practice, vaguely
defined. As late as 1843 in the then existing Texan war of independence
against Mexico, the British Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at
sea. Mexico made a contract for two ships of war with the English firm
of Lizardi & Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, the
ships were to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the
guns were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British
Navy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary authority to
purchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed to think strict
neutrality was secured if the same privileges were offered that country.
Later he prohibited naval officers to go in command. One Mexican vessel,
the _Guadaloupe_, left England with full equipment as originally
planned; the other, the _Montezuma_, was forced to strip her equipment.
But both vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were
permitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated. In
all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid Mexico, but
it is also clear that British governmental opinion was much in confusion
as to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See my book, _British
Interests and Activities in Texas_, Ch. IV.]
[Footnote 967: Bullock, _Secret Service under the Confederacy_.]
[Footnote 968: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American
Civil War_, p. 338-9.]
[Footnote 969: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
"Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama.'" Also _ibid._, "Correspondence
between Commissioner of Customs and Custom House Authorities at
Liverpool relating to the 'Alabama.'" The last-minute delay was due to
the illness of a Crown adviser.]
[Footnote 970: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264. Adams to
Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.]
[Footnote 971: Selborne, in his _Memorials: Family and Personal_, II, p.
430, declared that in frequent official communication with all members
of the Cabinet at the time, "I never heard a word fall from any one of
them expressive of anything but regret that the orders for the deten
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