d in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a
matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to
learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and
France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly
at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed
to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican
policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of
helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].
For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a
firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately
the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he
began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the
South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government.
As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could
be made to see this.
"... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it
worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they
are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or
lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it.
If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New
Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates
Charleston and Savannah[1159]."
This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the
United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the
warlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, long
confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was
acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire"
must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864,
Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of
the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military
expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the
arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially
by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote,
often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing
of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to
avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he
ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Na
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