ould be for the present that he
should be silent and to await events[1186]."

Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best
advantage the South to be rid of Russell:

"If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful,
Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being
brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he
can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us
perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified
assent[1187]."

But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British
policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a
change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory
attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of
course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the
Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was
renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster
followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of
censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental
policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the
Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial
majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of
Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was
needed[1189].

Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with
Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in
view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it
resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the
South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to
acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming
Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have
said little.

"At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that
he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt
obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the
obligation would be increased if I could take with me any
expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared
to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense
that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as
I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be