and shortly after the great Northern victories at
Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a despatch to Adams, July 11,
which has been interpreted as a definite threat of war. In substance
Seward wrote that he still felt confident the Government of Great
Britain would find a way to nullify the _Alexandra_ decision, but
renewed, in case this did not prove true, his assertion of Northern
intention to issue letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to
"pursue" Southern vessels even into neutral ports[1019]. But there are
two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely negative the
belligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not read or communicate
it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything serious was in mind; and he
did not instruct Adams to communicate it to Russell. The latter never
heard of it until the publication, in 1864, of the United States
diplomatic correspondence[1020].
In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell evidence
secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the Rams and to urge
their immediate seizure. Adams here but performed his duty and was in
fact acting in accordance with Russell's own request[1021]. On July 16
he reported to Seward that the Roebuck motion for recognition of the
South[1022] had died ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety
because of the slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape,
Adams wrote to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a
participant in the war[1023]. Further affidavits were sent to Russell on
August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell that the
Government was legally advised "they cannot interfere in any way with
these vessels," Adams sent still more affidavits and expressed his
regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently emphasized the grave
nature of the crisis pending between the United States and Great
Britain. To this Russell replied that the matter was "under serious and
anxious consideration," to which, on September 5, in a long
communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams escaped: "It would be
superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war."
The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat of war on
the explanation that Great Britain would herself be participating in the
war. There is no question that at the moment Adams thought Russell's
"change of policy" of April was now thrown overboard, but the fact was
that on September 1, R
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