te letters to his friends in America, urged some forward step on
slavery[912], but no such advice in despatches found its way into the
selected correspondence annually sent to print by Seward. Far more
important was the determination taken by Adams, less than a month after
he had presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward,
to give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention
would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object in
the war and that the North should be prepared to meet an European offer
of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish slavery such
mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would probably put an end
to the mediation itself, but it would also greatly strengthen the
Northern position abroad[913].

This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it was
assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on July 24,
Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of emancipation, wrote to
Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that European powers would not be
encouraged in interference, because of material interests, by a Northern
attempt to free the slaves[914]. Motley's answer began, "A thousand
times No," and Adams repeated his plea for a moral issue[915]. September
25, Adams met Seward's "material interests" argument by declaring that
for Great Britain the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not
scarcity, but uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but
know what to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the
Government[916]. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not agree with
Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet received when the
day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln issued the proclamation. On
that day in sending the text to Adams the comment of Seward was brief.
The proclamation, he said, put into effect a policy the approach of
which he had "heretofore indicated to our representatives abroad," and
he laid emphasis on the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation
was to convince the South that its true interests were in the
preservation of the Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was
the return of the South _with its slaves_[917]. Certainly this was far
from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. Seward's
first thought was that having held up the threat of servile insurrection
he must now remove that bogie. Four days later his judgment w