ms compelled the relaxation of the close blockade
the only recourse of the North would be to establish a "cruising
squadron" blockade remote from the shores of the enemy. If conducted by
government war-ships such a blockade was not in contravention to British
interpretation of international law[1008]. But the Northern navy,
conducting a cruising squadron blockade was far too small to interfere
seriously with neutral vessels bringing supplies to the Confederacy or
carrying cotton from Southern ports. A "flood of privateers," scouring
the ocean from pole to pole might, conceivably, still render effective
that closing in of the South which was so important a weapon in the
Northern war programme.

This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he saw in it
a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable ultimate clash
leading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's desire should be
Russell's reaction, though never specifically explaining the exact
purpose of the privateers. Moreover, nine-tenths of the actual
blockade-running still going on was by British ships, and this being so
it was to be presumed that "privateers" searching for possible blockade
runners would commit all sorts of indignities and interferences with
British merchant ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in
ordinary trade between non-belligerent ports.

Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering bill,
Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to raise
objections though not formally making official protest, and had asked
for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed activities of such
vessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be issued by the
Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty of preventing
unwarranted interference with legitimate British commerce by
privateers[1009]. The alteration of governmental policy as indicated in
the arrest of the _Alexandra_, it might be hoped, would at least cause a
suspension of the American plan, but assurances were strongly desired.
Presumably Russell knew that Adams as a result of their conversations,
had recommended such suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet
uninformed of the _Alexandra_ action, was still much alarmed. On April
13 he reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative
to the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a last
effort to avert the evils which the present state of