not agree
with them.

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree
with them.

"_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to
save or to destroy slavery_[893]."

Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknown
to the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussed
in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had presented
abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A month later,
September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, had
an audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laid
stress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe. This was but
nine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied
much as to Greeley, though he stated, "I will also concede that
Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are
incited by something more than ambition[894]." Immediately after the
event, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party,
Lincoln said, "I can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is
now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take
action upon it[895]." Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual
message to Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign
countries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt
mainly on the beneficial effects at home[896].

Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have been
convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation.
On the contrary, if he trusted Seward's judgment he may have _feared_
the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's prophecy. Here may have lain
the true meaning of Lincoln's speech of September 24--that it was now
for "the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it." After
all foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to the
President's control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout this
entire period of six months since the introduction of the Confiscation
Bill up to Lincoln's presentation of his draft proclamation to the
Cabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servile
insurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At
times Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at
times not.

Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State