ons would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a war,
Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all European
interests[899]...." A copy of this instruction Adams gave to Russell on
June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in reply to a query about
mediation that it would result in a servile war[900]. Evidently Adams
perfectly understood Seward's policy.

On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned emancipation
proclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone. Seward
commented favourably but wished to consider the proposal in all its
bearings before committing himself[901]. The day following he
transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that day introduced into
Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual and compensated
emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was unusual. Seward sent
the Bill without material comment[902], but it is apparent that this
method and measure of emancipation would much better fit in with his
theory of the slavery question in relation to foreign powers, than would
an outright proclamation of emancipation.

Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in British
neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that he had
learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet might soon
"take new ground[903]." This despatch if it reached Seward previous to
the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction of
the inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation. In that Cabinet,
Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement that
he advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of a
Northern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton's
notes of the meeting, "That foreign nations will intervene to prevent
the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton.... We break up our
relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty
years[904]." These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed
action. Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adams
covering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which,
fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905]. In it there
was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid the
South, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized. Seward
was clinging to his theory of correct policy.

Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions