Russia were in agreement
that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United
States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed
her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and
understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason
for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1,
1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow
knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.]

[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as
the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will
be shown.]

CHAPTER XII

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, relative
to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted at the moment
though time was to prove its permanence. The British press was full of
suggestions that the first trial might more gracefully come from France
since that country was presumed to be on more friendly terms with the
United States[846]. Others, notably Slidell at Paris, held the same
view, and on January 8, 1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon
III, asking separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon
dictated an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in
courteous terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended
recognition of the South[847]. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached
Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the _New
York Tribune_, to make an isolated French offer, but that he felt this
would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto maintained in
French-British relations. But Mercier added that if Lyons was
disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to advise his
Government to give him authority to act alone[848]. Lyons made no
comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that the
Settlement of the Contest should be made without the intervention
of England."

A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons desiring
to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia should act alone,
or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a proposal to the
North[849]. This was based on the supposition that the North, weary of
war, might ask the good offices of Russia. Lyons replied that he did not
think that contingency near and otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions;
but he was somewhat