e war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been
adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that
Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued
between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other
respects the independence of the South would have been established.
Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of
life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed
that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to
servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that
proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against
any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there
serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil
War[845].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March
16, 1862.]

[Footnote 735: _Ibid._, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a
purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the
Confederacy.]

[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]

[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report
of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his
speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to
England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not
come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends.
(Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they
are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't
say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I
am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."]

[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much
length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F.
Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his
_Life of C.F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp.
400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisis
in Downing Street_, Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp.
372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion
of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]

[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388.]