Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.]

[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76.]

[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40.]

[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving the
exact text paraphrased by Morley.]

[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire
letter. Sept. 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 767: _Ibid._, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes
much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the
Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that
she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to
Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have
counted for little.]

[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is
printed in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362.]

[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized,
(1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering
good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much
importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of
success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in
which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed
likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just
ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the
action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay
it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political
necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian
Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.)
Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter
from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow
expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to
introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the
differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This
seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to
Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of
extreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid._