rd. We are much
more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man
more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years
ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell
wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a
remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward
had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in
the _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone"
being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief
in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.

Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a
polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of
armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The
projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed
destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the
British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South
was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some
time come when European recognition would have to be given the
Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of
the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the
attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their
sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in
evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the
expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations
_now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result
in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised
good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though
personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in
the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which
determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw
his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover
both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as
the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were
brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true
policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].

For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous
crisis in th