Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of
conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in
comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern
arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a
single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838].
In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and
England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British
feeling[839].

The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of
European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It
expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to
animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally
responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no
cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific
instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to
present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward
believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He
wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession
intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget
them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by
Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to
the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that
answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that
Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].

So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed
to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for
immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons,
that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his
return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening
the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on
by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and
directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the
tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his
resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused
both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control
which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy
"I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Sewa