e conviction that if the old Union were restored both North
and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation,
said _The Index_, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous
fear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of the
bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year
following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a
statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was
primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of
Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never
shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of
these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than
useless[832]."
_The Index_ never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet
Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed,
wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the
only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the
Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been
led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--so
much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's
attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at
last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer
to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on
American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was
of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--a
plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment,
save to his correspondent.
In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the
public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new
policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when
the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America.
Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives"
were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it
would only do harm until there was a change of Government in
Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation
useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and
that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the
blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837].
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