FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336  
337   338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345   346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   >>   >|  
erest the reports of a British special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States. Anderson's reports emphasized three points: (1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed; (2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing cotton for a long time to come; (3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met with enthusiasm[792]. This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition "would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for the immediate present, writing to Russell: "Your description of the state of things between the two parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition with any advantage." * * * * * "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree to an armistice but whether they might not turn their thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336  
337   338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345   346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
Russell
 

present

 
condition
 

armistice

 

recognition

 

Palmerston

 
Clarendon
 

Western

 
States
 
reports

thought

 

arrangement

 

description

 

writing

 

rejection

 
insolent
 

things

 

conference

 

decision

 

parties


committed

 

acknowledged

 
extent
 

Russia

 
reached
 

Finally

 
October
 

answer

 

written

 
Parties

thoughts
 

Southern

 

Independence

 

advanced

 

acknowledgment

 

Northerners

 

restoration

 

position

 

inclined

 

departed


comprehensive

 

advantage

 

possibly

 
injury
 
proposition
 

distinct

 

communication

 

refused

 

emphasized

 
prosecution