which would be an act of
hostility towards the North[789]."
More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess,
fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was
Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his
male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet
crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after
Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis
circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He
agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in
America, but added with sarcasm:
"A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the
historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war
should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between
the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any
proposal of the English Government will be made, not by
dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent
partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal
indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it
would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it
is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be
addressed."
Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was
intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument
against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of
bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the
belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the
only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for
the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary
and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict
neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as
yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable
consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we
may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the
chances of good, and whether it is not--
'Better to endure the ills we have
Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'"
At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on
the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received
at the Foreign Office and read with int
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