ing his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ plan
of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his
speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.

Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he
treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the
Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground
of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his
arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet
acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was
his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must
acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be
undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when
it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of
international law that the independence of the Southern States had been
established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet
decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet
traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but
excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had
forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose
and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile
Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in
uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult,
indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was
done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby
was averse to action.

"He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_
recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the
ground that recognition would merely irritate the North
without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a
single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present
temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the
mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair
basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having
that which the other declared was vitally essential to its
existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out
the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of
the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant
to sweep away the blockade,