. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your
old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first
accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and
generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was
still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made
clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be
supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his
unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much
disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was
reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the
plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six
days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a
memorandum on America[782].

This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its
power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion
of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be
wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing
of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was
no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the
loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile
war--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the
Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty
to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly
the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and
recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an
armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about
and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly
negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is
to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and
now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in
a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet
decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on
October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that
it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying
Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office
memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously
maintain