ure or the
avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now
look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external
(i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling
(the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the
other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the
different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs,
and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look,
we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even
form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent
principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent
things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to
possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and
similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if
worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when
modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent
principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause
(of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those
attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as
clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such
as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter
into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary,
are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent
cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of
the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a
non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word
'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana
cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of
endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and
inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states,
while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a
different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the
operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the
sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing
to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences
exist in the effects i