gin to exist. Nor, again,
can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on
originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not
originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own;
for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other
causes; as the Sutras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/ada) themselves declare
(Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in
the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;'
VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17,
'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').--Nor, again, can it
be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like
effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are
supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not
standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new
quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same
relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which
they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not
originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of
sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with
regard to intelligence[359].

Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction
(sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class
different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows
that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes
from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last
argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.
Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction)
as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain
the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.
Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to
be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.
Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a
substance (Vai/s/. Sut. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of
things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body
is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which
inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not
perceptible, the body also, if it had for its i