nherent cause the five
elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible,
would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is
perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here
conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of
effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already
treated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has
been settled there already (why then is it again discussed
here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sa@nkhya, and at
present we have to do with the Vai/s/eshika.--But, already once, before
(II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was
simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not
simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sa@nkhya are
equally valid against the Vai/s/eshika?)--Because here, we reply, at the
beginning of the examination of the Vai/s/eshika system we prefer to
discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of
the Vai/s/eshikas.

12. In both cases also (in the cases of the ad/ri/sh/t/a inhering either
in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence
absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the
cause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We
see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for
instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with
them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction
co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the
general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from
those substances with which it is connected by the relation of
inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the
distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of
division into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its
mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is
composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not
be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the
world. Such is Ka/n/ada's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary
substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind),
we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the
limit of subdivision into minut