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is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work. 34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine) non-universality of the Self. We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting from the syadvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of
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