one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old
age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as
consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing
compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask
in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul
may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows
that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of
limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the
space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle
only, the extension of all the particles together will remain
inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of
the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited
size contains an infinite number of soul particles.

Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the
soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw
from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next
Sutra furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts
acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.
(of the soul).

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be
satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive
accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve
the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of
parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is
liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and
similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine
of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the
soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of
works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sara, rises when its bonds are
sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is
freed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which
in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and
cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently
remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determi