bject, and in addition cannot but attribute all
his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how
can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a
momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of
the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the
similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being
momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on
two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal
momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able
mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense
when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he
admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity
of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one
entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is
similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the
apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute
this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and
'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which
the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which
similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with
the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to
that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of
'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something
perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by
philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the
contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and
such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it
as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who
make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in
recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were
formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit
that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise
whether it is that or merely is similar t