or a general principle is proved by the absence
of contrary instances.
32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.
No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new
points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its
probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in
sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and
hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of
life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external
world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself
made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent
assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly
confused.--So that--and this the Sutra means to indicate--Buddha's
doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard
for their own happiness.
33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one
thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the
Gymnosophists (Jainas).
The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jiva),
non-soul (ajiva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),
destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].
Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul
and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under
these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the
two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikayas
('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul
(jiva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space
(aka/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful
ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,
which they call the saptabha@nginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;
somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and
is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is
and is not and is indescribable.
To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions
as that of unity and eternity[414].
This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reason
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