are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their
objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the
mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a
jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the
part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that
the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this
admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is
determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external
things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our
always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of
knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality
identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the
other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being
conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain
that there are no outward things.--

Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The
ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage
and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although
there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the
ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise
independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we
be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the
actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained
from the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless
sa/m/sara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and
effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again
produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason
for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas
is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,
moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both
(the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there
presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,
without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any
variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental
impressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outwa