o that; for mistakes may be
made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject
never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it
rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which
yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that
sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be
rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not
being observed.
The system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also
that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven
to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is
expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the
manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the
cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant
springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has
ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from
the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at
once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see
that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have
been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from
non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from
non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring
from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,
since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence
of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind
as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence
is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of
reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of
origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if
non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,
we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns
of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it
should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having
special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are
special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case
the fact of there being
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