xplain their alleged conjunction), we remark
that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the
result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive
rule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory
to reason or not--should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions
depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once
allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a
further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories
assumed by the Vai/s/eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we
could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this
transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living
beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the
released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which
consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms
by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be
connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not
exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance,
between wood and varnish[379].

Let it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavaya
relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which
abides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists
between the effected substance and the causal substance--is not
possible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence;
for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the
relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only
when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness
can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the
separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in
the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their
doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the
cause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite
extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we
acknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten,
and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the
Vai/s/eshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the
atoms.--If the Vai/s/eshika replies that those very parts which ar