e
owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his
(indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever,
forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are
capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.
Earth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest
thing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following
next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary
compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest
thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with
earth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/eshika might possibly raise
here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of
their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed
out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the
melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is
destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by
their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the
while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their
passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In
the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely
in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance,
and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there
taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak
arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare
the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the
authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others.
Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a
regard for their own spiritual welfare.

18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes,
(there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/eshikas cannot
be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called
semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough
doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of
being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the
difference of the views (maintained b