ertain difference be assumed, in
consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote
the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is
called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with
three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so
that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be
abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and
cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo
is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the
conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with
origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would
be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a
thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are
attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence
we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect
takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle;
otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the
former momentary existence, as having already been merged in
non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the
Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no
cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted
by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate
when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if
anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to
prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other
hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary
existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point
out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and
so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]
are momentary merely.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation
not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete)
interruption.

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on
constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is
different from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To