t) the preceding one ceases
to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal
relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account
for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they
cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members
of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit
that when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being
the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission
it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of
cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or
has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,
cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be
said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full
development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That
also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence
exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected
with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal
momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity
constitute its causal energy.--That assumption also is fruitless,
because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not
imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the
cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the
cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha
doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus
necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general
non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and
effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the
effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all
cases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which
the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another
state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these
alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the
first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing,
it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and
'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then,
secondly, the Bauddha says, a c