the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a
sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'
and 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely
negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive
characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the
mind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded
by an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant
destruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 'space' is meant absence in
general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three
non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24), the two
other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and
cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of
the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have
reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the
single members constituting the series.--The former alternative is
impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that
the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is
likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any
momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely
undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),
since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states
through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And
in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after
having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual
observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues
to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of
cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either
case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the
Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,
must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with
its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative
would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction
takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve
the uselessness of