es and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to
exist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things
which are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or
non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these
alternatives agrees with Vai/s/eshika principles. For the first
alternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the
cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads
only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as
its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the
threads. So the Vai/s/eshika-sutras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances
originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads
which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance,
viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour,
&c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine
is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being
non-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain
ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for
instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be
ayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in
character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the
substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being
identical with substance.

Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between
conjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist
separately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things
which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause
which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of
separate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his
definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the
connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate
existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two
terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be
connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that
the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if
the Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its
connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of
separate existence), and t