some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a
view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and
so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of
authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded
entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.
There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/eshika doctrine.--The
Vai/s/eshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter
of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality,
particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be
absolutely different from each other, and to have different
characteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.
Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts
the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of
depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just
as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being
absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the
qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot
depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on
substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is
present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and,
according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms
and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for
instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the
object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative
would involve the acceptation of the Sa@nkhya doctrine[372] and the
abandonment of the Vai/s/eshika standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/eshika may
say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on
it.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire
from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and
quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are
conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the
substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter
therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to
action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
If you (the Vai/s/eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not
non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because
substanc
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