series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can
be accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is
inadmissible.

14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or
non-activity).

Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially
active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there
being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is
possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be
permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially
non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could
take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.
If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to
depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the
ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent
activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being
taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent
non-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic
doctrine is untenable.

15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the
Vai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts
to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached
beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What
constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent),
belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,
and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its
colour, form, and other qualities.

This fundamental assumption of the Vai/s/eshikas we declare to be
groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and
other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and
permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause,
they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that
whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to
their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is
gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent;
and the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the
filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the
Vai/