r (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the
primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since
the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world
would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover,
if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual
inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would
happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on
account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in
that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an
operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine
would again be open to the objection stated before[333].

10. And moreover (the Sa@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of
its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.
Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some
places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed
from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from
self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs,
sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts
/S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and
Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the
Sa@nkhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sa@nkhya again brings a countercharge--The system of the
Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it
does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes
suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders
futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and
suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of
everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the
two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which
suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of
beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self,
it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches
perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering,
loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as
it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving
heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case