t, because the
intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these
two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because
it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the
employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not
really suffer.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to
the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become
venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor
does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You
must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of
sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit,
that, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].

But perhaps you (the Sa@nkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on
the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the
impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as
the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhana) is admitted to be
eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that,
although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and
of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet
suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the
two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the
non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul--and that hence, when
that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an
absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes
possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that
on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called
Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and
sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no
fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the
conjunction of soul and pradhana (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the
disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sa@nkhyas cannot escape
the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.
To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being
impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges
to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject
and object, and Scri