jects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes
of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta
teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the
other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the
possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion
of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning--we, the Vedantins, reply--is futile, because on
account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the
causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our
doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes
suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the
same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject.
But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If
fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and
light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself
since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with
reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and
sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed
(which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is
not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the
action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of
suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and
as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent
body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the
destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless
to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we
reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and
suffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sa@nkhya) also assume that the
affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can
you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because
through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach
to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how
then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer
and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain
that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called
passion that which causes suffering, we again objec