of water with
its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves,
&c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently,
although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the
state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of
waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and
light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers
constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from
ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general
point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are
understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not
essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state
of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the
object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would
already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter
state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for
instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter
never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if
the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire
and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of
desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and
would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this
is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and
'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation
exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the
object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what
is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person
(anarthin).

An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person,
an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person
enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of
the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of
aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of
aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term
'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the
soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e.
the ob