anency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final
release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the
different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the
pradhana's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the
other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the
Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature,
and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus
superior (to the soul of the Sa@nkhyas).
8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of
principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three
gu/n/as).
For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is
not possible.--The condition of the pradhana consists in the three
gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in
a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of
mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot
possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby
they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute
independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the
gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other
effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced
state of the gu/n/as--is impossible.
9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in
force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of
intelligence.
But--the Sa@nkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no
room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to
be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since
there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the
characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming
that their nature must be such as to render the production of the
effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady
nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation
of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.
Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were
founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world,
&c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the
power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sa@nkhya
should infe
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