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a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like. 6. Even if we admit (the Sa@nkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana). Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sa@nkhya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for neither the no
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