ligent
thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to
that in which it is actually observed (as the Sa@nkhya says), or to that
on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin
avers)?--We must, the Sa@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in
which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode)
are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand,
is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324]
existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are
the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the
inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies
and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this
very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is
observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists
consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence
activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we--the Vedantins--make the following reply.--We do not mean
to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in
which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from
an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present
and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of
burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar
material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not
due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not
exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when
fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the
Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the
movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of
intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be
raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising
moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which
is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of
motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid
of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of
sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the
eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present,
the Self