t produces, one person being affected by it
pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next
Sa@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the
limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all
inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things,
because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that
some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the
conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the
three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and
Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several
antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is
impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for
assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for
their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in
the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence
presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by
which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of
equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and
superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of
particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a
non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in
clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe
that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature
non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects
only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c.
in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is
seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the
world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity
without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.

But, the Sa@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the
part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the
part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they
are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sa@nkhya again
objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an
intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intel