perfect knowledge, because those
systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative
persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might
therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were
propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in
them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic
worthlessness.
But, it might be said, the Sa@nkhya and similar systems have already
been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4,
28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are
now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.
As the Sa@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to
establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them
in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have
hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether
fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an
independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-texts.
The Sa@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as
jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of
consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so
we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and
animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure,
pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness
in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together
constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is
non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform
modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.
enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence
of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as
the limitation of all effects and the like[316].
Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sankhyas base your
theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent
thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously
produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular
person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses,
palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according
to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleas
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