. 32, 33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated
in _Ethic._ vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is
"sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein
there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a
movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense,
it is a passion of the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second
perfection, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 1: and therefore when a thing
is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation,
delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed
above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we
designate, not its essence, but its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one,
according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the
appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to
the external operation. And so, although in him who has already
gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution
ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the
appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired
that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is
possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if
we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the
appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the
appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of
movement.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to
those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as
bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some
passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23,
AA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether Delight Is in Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is
a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all
movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in
respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore
pleasure is in time.

Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But
some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.

_On the co